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Case StudyNormal Greeble Learning
in a Severe Case
of Developmental Prosopagnosia
version (Diamond and Carey, 1986; Carey, 1992) claims
that expertise requires years to acquire.
To test the rapid view of expertise, we assessed
whether a developmental prosopagnosic could perform
normally in training with greebles. Greebles were de-
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33 Kirkland Street signed to place similar demands on recognition systems
as faces do. As can be seen in Figure 1, greebles haveCambridge, Massachusetts 02138
2 Institute of Imaging Science four features that are configured in a uniform manner
so that subjects must rely on the shape of the featuresVanderbilt University
CCC 1121 MCN and/or the precise spatial relations of those features.
The results of greeble training with normal subjects haveNashville, Tennessee 37232
been used to argue that training leads to effects that
have been considered face specific but which could, in
fact, be expertise specific. These include perceptualSummary
effects such as the composite effect (Gauthier et al.,
1998; Gauthier and Tarr, 2002) and the old-new configu-A central question in cognitive neuroscience is
ration effect (Gauthier and Tarr, 1997, 2002; Gauthier etwhether mechanisms exist that are specialized for
al., 1998) as well as neural effects such as increasedparticular domains. One of the most commonly cited
fusiform inversion effects in fMRI studies (Gauthier etexamples of a domain-specific competence is the hu-
al., 1999; Gauthier and Tarr, 2002) and increased N170sman ability to recognize upright faces. However, ac-
during ERP recordings (Rossion et al., 2002). Althoughcording to a widely discussed alternative hypothesis,
many of these claims have been disputed (McKone andface recognition is instead performed by mechanisms
Kanwisher, 2004), greeble training is the standardspecialized for processing any object class for which
method for the study of expertise. If face recognitionan individual has expertise. Faces, according to this
is performed by mechanisms operating on items fromdomain-general hypothesis, are just one example of
“rapid” expert object categories, then individuals whoan expert class. Nonface object expertise has been
are unable to acquire face expertise also should not beintensively investigated using a training procedure in-
able to acquire expertise with other stimulus classes.volving an artificial stimulus class known as greebles.
However, if face expertise and other types of expertiseA key prediction of this hypothesis is that individuals
depend on separate mechanisms, some individualswith face recognition impairments will also have im-
should show a dissociation between these two typespairments with other categories that control subjects
of expertise.have expertise with. Our results show that a man with
severe prosopagnosia performed normally throughout
Resultsthe standard greeble training procedure. These find-
ings indicate that face recognition and greeble recog-
Case Historynition rely on separate mechanisms.
The prosopagnosic subject, Edward, reports lifelong dif-
ficulties with face recognition, and he has never suffered
Introduction any serious head trauma. He recalls having difficulty
recognizing even his father as a child, and his prosopag-
Studies from neuropsychology (Farah, 1996; McNeil and nosia has been a serious social handicap for him
Warrington, 1993; Moscovitch et al., 1997), neurophysi- throughout his life. He is 53 years old, married, has
ology (Gross et al., 1972; Kreiman et al., 2000), psycho- PhDs in physics and theology, and works as a research
physics (Young et al., 1987; Tanaka and Farah, 1993), physicist. Edward scored normally on all tests of low-
and neuroimaging (Grill-Spector et al., 2004; Kanwisher level and mid-level vision. To properly test the rapid
et al., 1997; McCarthy et al., 1997) have provided evi- expertise hypothesis, it is important that prosopagno-
dence that upright face recognition is carried out by sics have normal object recognition, because prosopag-
mechanisms that are dissociable from those used for nosics with object agnosia may perform poorly with the
object recognition. However, the domain of these disso- greebles due to object recognition difficulties. Edward
ciable mechanisms is unclear. They could be specialized reports no difficulties with object recognition, and our
for faces per se or specialized for a variety of expert testing has not found any object impairments. He flaw-
object classes. There is no consensus in the literature lessly named 100 line-drawn objects from the Snod-
regarding what constitutes expertise, and there are two grass and Vanderwart (1980) set. On five tests of individ-
competing conceptions of expertise. In what we’ll call ual item object discrimination used in recent studies
the “rapid” version (Gauthier and Tarr, 1997, 2002; Gau- (Duchaine and Nakayama, 2004; Duchaine et al., 2003),
thier et al., 1998), expertise with a class can arise after Edward’s accuracy and response times were in the nor-
less than 10 hr of training. In contrast, the “extended” mal range for cars, horses, tools, sunglasses, and guns,
whereas he showed severely impaired performance in
the same paradigm with faces.*Correspondence: brad@wjh.harvard.edu
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Figure 1. Examples of Greebles
The greebles in the top row are in the same family.
Our tests have shown that Edward is impaired with
the discrimination of identity, emotion, and gender from
the face. He was able to name only three famous faces
out of 25 despite reporting substantial exposure to
nearly all of the faces (see Figure 2A). A large sample
of age-matched control subjects averaged 21.1 (SD 
3.6) on this test, so Edward’s score places him more
than six standard deviations below the mean. He has
also performed poorly on tests of unfamiliar face mem-
ory. For example, the face one in ten test (Duchaine,
2000) requires subjects to discriminate between novel
views of target and nontarget faces. Edward’s d’ score,
an unbiased measure of discrimination, of 1.78 was al-
most four standard deviations below the control mean
of 3.61 (SD  .49). In addition, his response times were
more than ten standard deviations longer than the aver-
age control response times. On the Cambridge memory
test for faces, subjects are introduced to six target faces
and then are tested with forced choice items consisting
of novel views of the target faces as well as two nontar-
get faces. In the introduction, subjects are tested on Figure 2. Face Recognition Results
18 items in which they know which target face will be
(A) Percent correct for Edward and the control subjects on the
presented. For the remaining 54 items, any of the six famous faces test.
target faces can be presented. We compared Edward’s (B) Percent correct for the upright and inverted conditions in the
sequential face matching test. There were two choices on eachperformance to nine age-matched control subjects. On
item, so chance is 50%.the items in the introduction, Edward responded cor-
rectly to 13 items, whereas all of the control subjects
were perfect on all 18 items. In the final 54 items, Edward
was correct on 26 items, whereas the controls averaged For our purposes, it is essential to establish that he
has little or no expertise with upright faces. To do this,43.8 (SD  6.4) with scores ranging from 35 to 53. His
total score was more than 3.5 standard deviations below we used a test of sequential face matching. A frontal
shot of a face was presented for 400 ms and then twothe mean. In addition, recordings done with magneto-
encephalography (MEG) found that Edward does not three-quarter profile shots were presented simultane-
ously for 1200 ms. Subjects were instructed to chooseshow the face-selective M170, which is found in normal
subjects (Liu et al., 2000). Among the 35 developmental the three-quarter profile face that matched the frontal
shot. Edward showed no advantage for upright match-prosopagnosics that we have tested in our laboratory,
Edward’s impairment with faces is one of the most se- ing compared to inverted matching (see Figure 2B), and
his upright score was far out of the normal range whilevere that we have seen.
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his inverted score was normal. A substantial advantage
for upright over inverted face processing is the hallmark
of face expertise (Yin, 1969; Diamond and Carey, 1986),
so it appears that he has no expertise for upright faces
despite 53 years of experience with them.
Control Subjects
The six control subjects had either a Master’s degree
or a PhD (2 men, 4 women, mean age  48, SD 
10.2). To confirm that they had normal face recognition
abilities, they were run with the famous face test and
the sequential face-matching test discussed above. All
performed normally on both tests, and all performed
better with upright face matching than inverted face
matching (see Figure 2). This upright advantage in the
context of normal performance indicates that they have
normal face expertise.
Greeble Training Results
The design of our training program was almost identical
to that used in a recent paper (Gauthier and Tarr, 2002)
and was very similar to that used in past training experi-
ments (Gauthier and Tarr, 1997; Gauthier et al., 1998).
The identities of five individual greebles were presented
in the first session, and five additional identities were
presented in each of the next three sessions. Thus, by
the fourth session subjects had been introduced to the
identities of 20 different greeble individuals. There were
a total of eight sessions, and no greebles were intro-
duced in the final four sessions. Individuals in the same
family share the same general body shape, and familiar-
ization with all five families takes place in the first ses-
sions. Knowledge of the greebles was assessed with
two types of test trials. On verification trials, a label is
briefly presented (either an individual name or a family
name) and it is followed by a greeble. The greeble re-
mained visible until subjects indicated whether the label
and the greeble were consistent. On naming trials, sub-
jects were presented with a greeble and identified it by
pressing the letter key corresponding to the first letter
of the greeble’s name.
The rapid expertise hypothesis predicts that Edward’s
performance will be comparable to the controls in the
early part of the training when the control subjects have
not developed expertise. However, in the later sessions
when the controls have developed expertise, it predicts
that Edward’s performance will become progressively
worse compared to the controls. Figure 3 displays accu-
racy with the greebles for the control subjects and Ed- Figure 3. Greeble Training Accuracy Results
ward. Because greebles are added during the early ses- Percent correct for the three types of trials assessing greeble
sions of training, we have scaled the figures displaying knowledge.
the naming accuracy and individual verification accu- (A and B) For the naming trials (A) and the individual verification
trials (B), we have scaled the scores to reflect the number of greeblesracy in the same manner for each subject to reflect the
with names at each point in the training. For example, subjects hadnumber of known greebles in each session (5, 10, 15,
only been introduced to 5 of the 20 greebles in session 1, so we20). For example, in the first session, we divided the
divided their percent correct by 4 and placed the 100% level for
percent correct for each subject by 4 so that 100% session 1 at 25% of the total percent correct.
correct for the first session was set at 25% of total (C) Percent correct for the family verification trials.
percent correct. Figure 3A shows scaled percent correct
for the naming trials. Contrary to the predictions of the
rapid expertise hypothesis, Edward is performing as well mance is also normal on the individual verification trials.
Finally, Figure 3C shows that he performs very well onas the four best performing control subjects and sub-
stantially better than two of the more poorly performing the family naming trials.
Figure 4 shows his mean response times for the threecontrols. Similarly, Figure 3B shows that his perfor-
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expertise hypothesis. He presents an extreme example
of face recognition impairments, and the selectivity of
his face deficits is as pronounced as any reported. His
normal performance with greebles is wholly inconsistent
with the view that his deficit is caused by a deficit to
domain-general expertise mechanisms that are en-
gaged after only hours of training.
There are two ways to interpret Edward’s performance
relative to the control subjects. One possibility is that
Edward and the controls developed greeble expertise,
because both have whatever mechanisms are neces-
sary for rapid expertise acquisition. On this account,
these rapid expertise mechanisms are separate from
the mechanisms used for face recognition and those
used for nonexpert object recognition. However, we be-
lieve that the more fundamental issue as to whether
greeble training leads to qualitatively different (i.e., ex-
pert) processing needs to be raised. If greeble training
does not produce expertise, then Edward and the con-
trol subjects simply relied on ordinary object recognition
mechanisms to recognize the greebles. We favor this
second interpretation.
As mentioned above, it has been claimed that greeble
training leads to perceptual and neural effects that are
similar to effects seen almost exclusively with faces
(Gauthier and Tarr, 1997, 2002; Gauthier et al., 1998). A
close review of this evidence, however, does not support
these claims (McKone and Kanwisher, 2004). The pres-
ence of three perceptual effects thought to be face spe-
cific has been assessed after greeble training, and these
subjects have not shown face-like effects (Gauthier and
Tarr, 1997, 2002; Gauthier et al., 1998). There is no evi-
dence that greeble training leads to face-like inversion
effects nor is there clear evidence for the transfer of
expertise to novel sets of greebles (Gauthier et al., 1998).
The neural evidence for face-like processing after gree-
ble training is similarly unpersuasive. There are no dem-
onstrations that training leads to increased activation in
the fusiform gyrus during greeble viewing (McKone and
Kanwisher, 2004), and ERP studies have shown that
greeble training leads to left-lateralized markers rather
than the right-lateralized markers seen with faces (Ros-
Figure 4. Greeble Training Response Times sion et al., 2002).
Thus, it appears most likely that, like past greebleResponse times in ms for the three types of trials: (A) naming RT,
(B) individual verification RT, and (C) family verification RT. Re- subjects, neither Edward nor the controls acquired ex-
sponse times are reported in geometric means. Geometric means pertise during training but rather simply became familiar
were used in past greeble papers, because they are less susceptible with the greeble-name pairs and the task demands. In
to outliers.
light of past suggestions that expertise requires roughly
ten years of experience (Carey, 1992), it is not surprising
trial types over the eight sessions, and he is in the normal that ten hours of training does not produce expertise.
range here as well. Thus, speed-accuracy trade-offs Because arguments for the rapid conception of exper-
cannot explain his normal accuracy. The percent correct tise have claimed support solely from experiments in-
for the middle-aged control subjects is similar to that volving greeble training, there is currently no evidence
for undergraduate subjects in previous experiments that recognition mechanisms like those used with up-
(Gauthier and Tarr, 1997, 2002; Gauthier et al., 1998) as right faces can be activated or assembled after only
well for the undergraduates who served as our pilot hours of experience with a nonface object class. This
subjects. As expected, the response times were slower is not to deny that the visual system can be tuned over
for the middle-aged subjects than for the undergradu- short time scales, but only that processing like that seen
ates used in previous experiments and our pilot experi- with faces does not emerge over such time scales.
ments. Edward’s results also provide additional evidence sup-
porting the double dissociation between face and object
Discussion processing provided by neuropsychological cases (Farah
et al., 1995; McNeil and Warrington, 1993; Moscovitch
Edward’s normal performance in the greeble training et al., 1997; Nunn et al., 2001). This dissociation could be
accounted for by face-specific mechanisms or expertisewould seem to provide a clear refutation of the rapid
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opagnosic: evidence for separate developmental processes. Neuro-mechanisms like that proposed by the “extended” con-
case 9, 380–389.ception of expertise. Our results do not bear on the merits
Farah, M.J. (1996). Is face recognition “special”? Evidence fromof either hypothesis, but past cases suggest that face
neuropsychology. Behav. Brain Res. 76, 181–189.expertise and real-world nonface expertise are dissocia-
Farah, M.J., Levinson, K.L., and Klein, K.L. (1995). Face perceptionble (Moscovitch et al., 1997; Sergent and Signoret,
and within-category discrimination in prosopagnosia. Neuropsycho-
1992). Future investigations focused on the existence logia 33, 661–674.
of this dissociation should provide a means to more
Gauthier, I., and Tarr, M.J. (1997). Becoming a “greeble” expert:
precisely characterize the nature of the mechanisms exploring face recognition mechanisms. Vision Res. 37, 1673–1682.
performing face recognition. Gauthier, I., and Tarr, M.J. (2002). Unraveling mechanisms for expert
object recognition: bridging brain activity and behavior. J. Exp. Psy-
Experimental Procedures chol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 28, 431–446.
Gauthier, I., Williams, P., Tarr, M.J., and Tanaka, J. (1998). TrainingMaterials
“greeble” experts: a framework for studying expert object recogni-A set of 30 photorealistically rendered, grayscale greebles were
tion processes. Vision Res. 38, 2401–2428.used. The greebles were approximately 11 cm high and 7 cm at
Gauthier, I., Tarr, M.J., Anderson, A.W., Skudlarski, P., and Gore,their widest. At our viewing distance of 60 cm, they subtended about
J.C. (1999). Activation of the middle fusiform “face area” increases10.5  6.7 of visual angle.
with expertise in recognizing novel objects. Nat. Neurosci. 2,
568–573.Procedure
Grill-Spector, K., Knouf, N., and Kanwisher, N. (2004). The fusiformEach subject participated in eight training sessions. The first four
face area subserves face perception, not generic within-categorytraining sessions lasted approximately 1 hr each while the remaining
identification. Nat. Neurosci. 7, 555–562.four sessions lasted approximately 15 min each. The five family
names were introduced in the first session by presenting greebles Gross, C.G., Roche-Miranda, G.E., and Bender, D.B. (1972). Visual
accompanied by their family label. Following this, we also presented properties of neurons in the inferotemporal cortex of the macaque.
an image for 20 s that showed two examples from each family so J. Neurophysiol. 80, 324–330.
that subjects could view the similarities and differences between Kanwisher, N., McDermott, J., and Chun, M. (1997). The fusiform
the families. Individual names for five greebles were learned in each face area: a module in human extrastriate cortex specialized for the
of the first four sessions so that a total of 20 individual names were perception of faces. J. Neurosci. 17, 4302–4311.
learned. Each individual name began with a different letter. Subjects
Kreiman, G., Koch, C., and Fried, I. (2000). Category-specific visuallearned the names by viewing the greeble accompanied by its name
responses of single neurons in the human medial temporal lobe.and then practiced naming it by pressing the key corresponding to
Nat. Neurosci. 3, 946–953.its first name. Following each practice trial, subjects received a
Liu, J., Higuchi, M., Marantz, A., and Kanwisher, N. (2000). Magneto-feedback trial displaying the correct name.
physiological studies of face and non-face processing. NeuroreportFollowing the introductory phase, subjects were tested with
11, 337–341.blocks of verification trials and naming trials. The number of test
trials in the first four sessions ranged from 495 to 680 and there McCarthy, G., Puce, A., Gore, J., and Allison, T. (1997). Face-specific
were 180 trials in each of the final four sessions. On verification processing in the fusiform gyrus. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 9, 605–610.
trials, subjects were presented with a label (either a family name or McKone, E., and Kanwisher, N. (2004). Does the human brain pro-
an individual name) for 1000 ms, and after a 200 ms interval a greeble cess objects-of-expertise like faces: an update. In From Monkey
was presented. Subjects indicated with a key press whether the Brain to Human Brain, S. Dehaene, J.R. Duhamel, M. Hauser, and
label and the greeble were consistent. On some verification trials, G. Rizzolatti, eds. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), in press.
a label reading “No Name” was presented, and subjects indicated
McNeil, J.E., and Warrington, E.K. (1993). Prosopagnosia: a face-
whether they had learned a name for that greeble. On naming trials,
specific disorder. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 46A, 1–10.
subjects were presented with a greeble and indicated the greeble’s
Moscovitch, M., Winocur, G., and Behrmann, M. (1997). What isfirst name with the first letter of its name. When greebles without
special about face recognition? Nineteen experiments on a personnames were presented, the correct answer was a space bar press.
with visual object agnosia and dyslexia but normal face recognition.
J. Cogn. Neurosci. 9, 555–604.Acknowledgments
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